Subjectivity: Locating the First-Person in *Being and Time*

Steven Crowell

Rice University

It is often held that, in contrast to Husserl, Heidegger's account of intentionality makes no essential reference to the first-person stance. This paper argues, on the contrary, that an account of the first-person, or 'subjectivity', is crucial to Heidegger's account of intelligibility (world) and so of the intentionality, or 'aboutness' of our acts and thoughts, that rests upon it. It first offers an argument as to why the account of intelligibility in Division I of *Being and Time*, based on a form of third-person self-awareness, provides a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for intentionality. It then shows that Heidegger provides a further necessary condition in his analysis of the collapse of the one-self in Division II. This condition is 'conscience', which is both a genuine first-person mode of self-awareness and, it is argued, the origin of reason as that which distinguishes factic 'grounds' from normative 'justifications'.

> This must be constantly borne in mind, namely, that the subjective problem is not something about an objective issue, but is the subjectivity itself.
> – Kierkegaard

I. Introduction

It is the chief task of philosophy of mind to provide an account of intentionality. What this amounts to can be variously formulated: How is it possible that consciousness is consciousness 'of' something? How can our mental states have 'content'? What accounts for the 'as-structure' of our experience? And so on. How one formulates the question is already the outline of an answer, and so debates in philosophy of mind are inseparable from decisions about broader questions of philosophy. One such decision concerns the ontology of, as Heidegger puts it, 'the entity which is intentional'.[1] John Haugeland has usefully distinguished between 'right-wing' (or individualist) and 'left-wing' (or socialist) theories of this entity.[2] Individualist positions, broadly Cartesian in orientation, tend to link the question of intentionality quite closely to aspects of the first-person stance. For such theories, content is either 'in the head', and then some plausible

account of how such content can deliver the world as it purports to do must be given; or else 'meaning just ain't in the head', in which case the task is to explain the relation between so-called 'wide' and 'narrow' content, or why I sometimes seem authoritatively to know what I am thinking about (first-person authority).[3] Socialist positions, in contrast, emphasize the activities of the entity who is intentional, arguing that the 'as-structure' of experience is tied to the normativity inherent in social practices and has little or nothing to do with the 'mental' in the Cartesian (and broadly psychological) sense stressed by the individualists. For these theorists, first-person authority is either denied outright (Wittgensteinian behaviorism), or else relegated to a non-explanatory role.[4]

If I am allowed an unconscionably gross simplification, I would say that the fundamental issue separating positions in philosophy of mind concerns the place of the first-person in an account of intentionality. In any case, this simplification guides the present essay, for the issue has played an important role in assessing the phenomenological accounts of intentionality given by Husserl and Heidegger. It is often held that the first-person perspective, so crucial for Husserl, occupies no significant place in *Being and Time*.[5] I shall argue the contrary, that first-person authority plays a decisive role in Heidegger's account of intentionality. This will prove to be a somewhat peculiar notion of 'first-person authority', but I will defend it by offering a 'phenomenological interpretation' (in Heidegger's sense) of *Being and Time* in which I show, first, that there is an account of first-person authority in that text and, second, that it is not a mere afterthought but is indispensable for clarifying the 'ontic transcendence' whereby we grasp something as something. More specifically, I will argue that Heidegger's phenomenology of conscience (*Gewissen*) is an account of first-person self-awareness – or the 'subjectivity of the subject'.[6] – and that the sort of first-person authority embedded in this account constitutes the origin of reason. By 'reason' here I mean, minimally, the ability to think and act not merely in accord with norms, but *in light* of them. The thesis is that for Heidegger, first-person authority is what transforms (factic) 'grounds' into (normative) 'reasons' (*Gründe*) and explains how it is that Dasein dwells in a world and does not merely function in an environment.[7]

II. Two Conceptions of First-Person Authority

Let us begin by noting why it is commonly held that there is no significant treatment of the first-person (or 'subjectivity') in *Being and Time*. One reason is that Heidegger's text is frequently understood as a complete rejection of all things Husserlian. As Heidegger wrote to Jaspers in 1926, 'If the treatise has been written "against" anyone, then it has been written against Husserl'.[8]

Now consider David Carr's claim that Husserl's 'phenomenology is not just about experiences, or even about experiences and their objects, but about the first-person standpoint itself. [. . .] It is about what it means to be conscious or to be a conscious being, to be a subject, a self, or an ego'.[9] If this is essentially correct (as I take it to be), it might seem that in rejecting Husserl Heidegger must lose all interest in 'the first-person standpoint itself'. Such an impression can only be enhanced if one considers why Husserl is interested in the first-person stance in the first place – namely, because it apparently possesses authority with regard to its *contents* (intentional experiences), on the one hand, and with regard to its *self-awareness* (as transcendental ego), on the other. Neither conception of first-person authority seems present in Heidegger's text.

On the matter of Husserl's interest in *Erlebnisse*, for instance, Hubert Dreyfus has argued that Heidegger's account of Dasein as a kind of 'comportment' – skillful coping in the world – renders any appeal to 'conscious experiences' otiose in an explanation of intentionality. The mental – in the traditional sense of consciousness as psychological subjectivity – becomes a rather minor modification of 'mindless coping' according to explicit or tacit norms of social or 'background' practices. These practices suffice to explain how things can show up 'as' the things they are. Hence, 'we are not to think of Dasein as a conscious subject' since any such traditional conception must, according to Dreyfus, reintroduce what Heidegger specifically rejects: the Cartesian 'cabinet of consciousness' with its 'mental representations' that are supposed to be foundational for our access to the world.[10]

Similarly, on the question of the authority of first-person self-awareness, Heidegger is apparently quite clear that little is to be gained ontologically from such self-awareness. First, though it is true that the 'question of the "who" [of Dasein] answers itself in terms of the "I" itself, the "subject", the "Self" ' (BT 150/114), Heidegger is quick to point out that this gives us nothing more than a mere 'formal reflective awareness of the "I" ' (BT 151/115). And it seems obvious, as Dreyfus argues, that 'such self-referential consciousness is not the subject-matter of *Being and Time*', since 'according to Heidegger such consciousness is a special mode of revealing and a derivative one at that'.[11] As Heidegger puts it in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, a deliberate, reflective 'I-awareness' is 'only a mode of self-*apprehension*, but not the mode of primary self-disclosure'. This latter is a self-awareness mediated by social practices: Dasein 'never finds itself otherwise than in the things themselves'; it does not 'need a special kind of observation' because when 'Dasein gives itself over immediately and passionately to the world, its own self is reflected back to it from things'.[12] Even if formal-reflective I-awareness has some sort of authority, it is hard to see how it could be of much philosophical interest.

These arguments are compelling, but to say that the first-person stance does not have its traditional significance in Heidegger's text is not to say that it has *no* significance at all. It is not impossible that explicit criticism of the Cartesian tradition coexists with an implicit *existential reinterpretation* of aspects of that tradition, such that there is a recognizable role for first-person authority, but one that is identified neither with privileged access to the content of my mental states as foundational for intentionality nor with a formal-reflective I-awareness supposedly definitive of who I am as 'transcendental' ego. This, at any rate, is what I hope to show in what follows.

In presenting Heidegger's existential reinterpretation I shall not focus on the first sense of first-person authority, concerning a special warrant regarding the content of my mental states, but on the second sense, concerning the peculiar character of first-person self-awareness. A reinterpretation of the first would indeed be possible. It would start by demonstrating that Husserl's concept of first-person warrant does not commit him to representationalism or 'internalism', and that Heidegger was aware of this. The latter's remarks about the 'cabinet of consciousness' are directed specifically at Nicolai Hartmann and not at the phenomenologists.[13] Thus, if it turned out that there were a philosophically interesting sense in which reference to consciousness *had* to figure in an account of intentionality,[14] this would not by itself be an argument against Heidegger's position, since he is not committed to the view that any appeal to first-person consciousness must involve one in the dead-end of a 'worldless' subject. Nevertheless, because Heidegger is practically silent on any role that first-person warrant might play in the account of intentionality,[15] the whole argument would require lengthy reconstructions. It is quite different with respect to the second sense of 'first-person authority', however. For *Being and Time* is explicit about what an existential reinterpretation of first-person self-*awareness* should look like, and it also suggests (though not nearly as explicitly) just why such a reinterpretation is crucial to the account of intentionality. So to this I now turn.

III. A Gap in the Account of Self-Awareness in *Being and Time* Division I

For all its usefulness, Heidegger's account of ontologically primordial self-awareness as a 'reflection back' from the things with which I am practically absorbed cannot be considered an adequate account of self-awareness. Nor did Heidegger intend it as such. This is because the 'I' who is reflected back in this way is 'the "who" of *everyday* Dasein', and this, as Heidegger says, 'just is *not* the "I myself"' ' (BT 150/114). Thus Dasein, as 'I myself', must be capable of another – and ontologically no less authoritative – mode of self-awareness, one not subject to Heidegger's objections against the merely

formal character of reflective I-consciousness. The trick is to say what such a form of self-awareness can be.

An approach can be made by recognizing that the everyday mode of self-awareness in which 'Dasein understands itself proximally and for the most part in terms of its world' (BT 156/120) is not a genuine *first-person* mode of self-awareness. As Heidegger argues, 'the self of everyday Dasein is the *one-self* ' (BT 167/129), and it becomes evident from his description of the one-self that it understands (is aware of) itself wholly in third-person terms – a fact that has implications for his account of intentionality.

Central to that account is Heidegger's claim that things show up 'as' something originally within the context of our practical *dealings* with them. It is because everyday Dasein engages in goal-directed actions that things show up 'as' fit for the task, useful 'in order to' drive nails, and so on; only so can they be assigned some non-arbitrary 'significance'. About this 'assignment', Heidegger emphasizes two things. First, it is holistic: 'Taken strictly, there "is" no such thing as *a* tool. To any tool there always belongs a totality of equipment' (BT 97/68), since to be a hammer or a pen is to be defined in instrumental relation to other things such as nails or paper. Second, the structure (intelligibility) of this equipmental totality derives from Dasein's own 'practical identity', which Heidegger terms the *Worumwillen*: an 'ability to be for the sake of which' I myself am (BT 119/86). This concept is meant to account for the non-arbitrary attribution of goal-directedness to my activity – that is, it is to serve the role of establishing an *intention*, without which no *specific* 'assignment' of functions to things could be made. Heidegger's innovation here is to locate this intention not 'in the head' but in practices themselves, as 'ways for me to be' in the world. One cannot simply identify this practical identity or 'for the sake of' with social role (mother, professor, mailcarrier), since not all goal-directed actions belong to socially and institutionally *defined* practices. Nevertheless, it can serve its function in the account of intentionality only because it, like social role, is necessarily *typical*. Only because my behavior is understood (not only by the other but by I myself) as a type does it have the relation to specific norms *of* the type that render it 'intentional' behavior – that is, assessable in terms of success or failure.[16] Heidegger expresses this fact with the claim that everyday Dasein is governed by 'publicness', that it 'concerns itself as such with *averageness*', and that it is 'diffident' (*abständig*), careful that it *not* distinguish itself from others (BT 164–65/126–27). For this reason Heidegger designates the self of everyday Dasein the 'one-self'.

Heidegger's account of the one-self, then, describes my practical identity as a specific form of anonymity: engaged in the world, I am aware of myself only as 'another' or as 'anyone' – that is, in third-person terms. As typical, my practices belong within what Heidegger calls a 'totality of involvements', and because it is in terms of such practices that I am 'reflected back to [myself]

from things', *I myself* make sense only within that same totality. I am a *persona* (mask). To the extent that my practical identity is typical – and there can be no other kind – there is essentially no difference between the way things come by their 'as-structure' and the way I come by mine. It is true that Heidegger *signals* a difference between our awareness of things, of others, and of myself – namely, as *besorgen, fürsorgen*, and *selbst-sorgen* – but Division I does not account for these different phenomenological features of our experience, and because it does not, a gap opens up in its account of intentionality.

The gap appears because Heidegger holds that in order for something to be assigned a *definite* significance (an 'in order to') in the totality of involvements the latter must 'itself [go] back ultimately to a "towards which" in which there is *no* further involvement' (BT 116/84) – that is it must be anchored in something 'autotelic', something that does not receive its 'assignment' of significance from something else but 'has assigned *itself* to an "in order to" ' (BT 119/86). Without such a being it would be impossible to say whether something was functioning well as a heater or poorly as an air-conditioner; it takes on a definite meaning in light of that 'for the sake of which' *I* am using it. But what or who am 'I' here? If I, in turn, am assigned 'my' significance instrumentally, then the totality of involvements is once again underdetermined and the intentionality of experience has not been explained. For this reason, Heidegger identifies 'Dasein's very being' as 'the sole authentic "for the sake of which" ' (BT 117/84) – that is as 'a "towards which" in which there is *no* further involvement'. And yet, nothing in his account of the *Umwillen* or significance of the one-self allows us to see *why* it has no further involvement, why it is *not* just another instrumentality. For as typical, any 'for the sake of' can also be understood instrumentally: I can be a professor in order to make a living, be a college student in order to avoid the draft, be a father in order to carry on the family line, and so on.

Heidegger is right that the totality of involvements must be anchored in a being 'in which there is *no* further involvement' – that is in a being for whom things *matter*, a being 'for which, in its being, that very being is essentially an *issue*' (BT 117/84). But such a being must be capable of a mode of self-awareness other than the one that characterizes its practical identity. In addition to its everyday (third-person) mode of self-awareness, Heidegger owes us an account of Dasein's first-person awareness of 'I myself', an account of the subjectivity that belongs to, but remains invisible in, the one-self. Without it, his account of intentionality remains incomplete. And if third-person self-awareness is necessarily typical, it is not unreasonable to expect that first-person self-awareness will be radically indexical.

Is there such an account to be found in *Being and Time*? In approaching this question I will begin by considering certain peculiarities of first-person self-reference (saying 'I') that any theory must account for. The idea is to take

these features of first-person self-reference as indicators of the nature of first-person self-awareness and then see whether anything in *Being and Time* addresses what is distinctive about that nature.[17]

First, the proper use of 'I' infallibly picks out the entity it purports to refer to – both in the sense that it cannot fail to refer, and in the sense that it cannot fail to pick out exactly what it purports to pick out. By contrast, in using a proper name or definite description to refer to the same thing, I could always fail in either way. But since the one-self is aware of itself precisely in so far as 'it does *not* distinguish itself from others', when *it* says 'I' both the definiteness and infallibility of its self-reference remain unaccounted for. It is always prone to a 'failure of reference' or an 'error of misidentification'.

Second, if we distinguish a subjective from an objective use of 'I', we note a crucial aspect of first-person self-reference. An objective use of 'I' (as in 'I am bleeding' or 'I am six feet tall') presupposes that I have established certain properties as true of an object in the world and that I have identified myself with that object. Thus I could be in error if the object in question turns out in fact not to be me. The subjective use of 'I' (as in 'I believe that Heidegger wrote *Being and Time*' or 'I feel anxious') involves no such presupposition.[18] The possession of identificatory knowledge is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for successful use of 'I' in these cases. As Castañeda observes, 'there is no third-person special characteristic that one has to think that one possesses in order to think of oneself as I'.[19] In short, such self-identification is immediate, non-criterial, and non-inferential.

This point will prove crucial for establishing the place of first-person self-awareness in *Being and Time*, since it shows that even though self-identification of the one-self is neither immediate nor non-criterial – that is, the awareness of myself 'reflected back from things' is always *as* something (father, professor, etc.) and thus mediated by criteria belonging to these types or roles – this does not mean that, should such criteria be unavailable, I could not intelligibly refer to, or identify, myself.

Finally, use of 'I' to designate 'I myself' *requires* that I 'dispense with every type of third-person reference'.[20] That is, I have not mastered the use of 'I' unless I understand that it does not, as Zahavi puts it, merely 'single a specific person out in a given context' – the person who is speaking – but demands also that I be 'aware that it is [I myself] who is referred to'. And this sort of self-awareness cannot be captured in any third-person terms, since 'no matter how detailed a third-person description I give of a person, this description cannot entail that *I* am that person'.[21] Hence, the way 'I' refers cannot be reduced to any form of the way third-person terms pick out entities in the world. If it could be so reduced it would be impossible to understand the *surprise* exhibited (to use Nozick's example) by Oedipus when he discovers that he is the very entity to whom he was (*successfully*) referring all along in third-person terms.

Before showing that Heidegger provides an account of first-person self-awareness that does justice to these peculiarities of self-reference, it may be useful to identify two solutions to the problem which he rejects. The first is Husserl's theory that saying 'I' ultimately refers to a unique transcendental *ego* that eludes all type-concepts, including natural kind concepts. Because the 'I' is identifiable prior to all 'worldly' predicates, Husserl takes it to pick out an 'unworldly' entity in a sense that supposedly avoids the paradox of a 'piece of the world' constituting the world as a whole. Though the situation is complicated,[22] it is clear that Heidegger wants to avoid positing anything like an ego as the referent of 'I'. Whatever tensions there may be between first- and third-person self-reference will be explained, instead, as existential modalities of *Jemeinigkeit*.

The second rejected approach is that of Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus*. There the peculiarities of immediate, non-criteriological, non-inferential self-reference do not reflect an entity in or beyond the world, but the 'limit' of the world itself. On this view, there *is* nothing of which I am aware when I am aware of myself in first-person perspective, and the whole issue of 'subjectivity' becomes a philosophical non-starter. Some have held that this is precisely *Heidegger's* approach to the issue.[23] Rather than argue against this interpretation, however, I will try to establish that there *is* an account of first-person self-awareness in *Being and Time* by considering the relation between Division I and Division II of that text.

About this strategy the following should be emphasized straightaway: First, though Division II offers an account of 'authentic' being-a-self to complete Division I's exploration of the everyday one-self, it would be a mistake to equate first-person self-awareness with authenticity. As Heidegger tells us, 'authentic existence' is 'only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon' (BT 224/179). The authentic self's awareness of itself is thus not free of the machinery of third-person description that supports the one-self, as is required by our analysis of first-person self-reference; it too is 'reflected back to itself from things'. Second, since 'the "one" itself articulates the referential context of significance' (BT 167/129) – and so, as Dreyfus argues, all intelligibility is *everyday* intelligibility because the one ultimately 'makes . . . significance and intelligibility possible'.[24] – it must be the case that Dasein's first-person self-awareness, like Wittgenstein's 'I', is not a mode of *intelligibility* at all. Does this not reduce the very notion to incoherence? If being-in-the-world were equivalent to acting in the world this conclusion would follow, but Heidegger's position is more complicated. While both the one-self and the authentic self are 'actors', there is a condition in which Dasein no longer acts, the condition of the *collapse* of the one-self. Here we find both the place and the importance of first-person self-awareness in *Being and Time*. In this putatively negative phenomenon, where the care-structure is not yet the resolute committed authentic self engaged in the world,

there lies a positive phenomenological content – not some further content descriptive of myself that more richly answers the question of who I am, but my very subjectivity.

IV. The Collapse of the One-Self as First-Person Self-Awareness

I shall pursue the familiar details of the care-structure – existentiality, facticity, and discourse – only so far as is necessary to see how the breakdown of the one-self can yield a positive grasp of subjectivity. Heidegger associates facticity with *Befindlichkeit* and argues that the 'primary discovery of the world' is a function 'of "bare mood" ', thanks to which the world is there as mattering to us in some way or another (BT 176–7/137–8). Existentiality, in turn, is associated with *Verstehen* – not the thematic understanding of this or that item in the world, but the *self*-understanding Dasein exhibits as it 'presses ahead' into that 'ability to be for the sake of which it itself is' (BT 119/86). Finally, 'discourse' (*Rede*) is 'the articulation of intelligibility' (BT 203–4/161), that is the ontological ground of communication. Now the salient point here is that since the 'one' articulates 'the referential context of significance' – the world – as such, the one-self cannot be identified with some limited set of possibilities. All possible ways in which the world can matter, all possible self-understandings or 'for-the-sake-ofs', and all possible discursive communications belong to the one-self – as public, conforming, normalized third-person Selfhood. A genuine first-person self-awareness would thus seem to be strictly impossible.

And so it would be, if self-awareness were necessarily linked to 'possibility' in Heidegger's sense. But this is not the case, as can be seen from Heidegger's account of the *breakdown* of the one-self. This modification of the care-structure has special methodological significance, as Heidegger says, because it is 'what Dasein, *from its own standpoint*, demands as the only ontico-ontological way of access to itself' (BT 226/182). And this, I shall argue, is equivalent to providing phenomenological access to 'subjectivity' as the condition of possibility for authentic selfhood – a condition that has more in common with what Kierkegaard identified as 'inwardness' than it does the Cartesian stream of *Erlebnisse* that we share with higher animals.

First, if everyday Dasein's moods are that whereby the world matters to it, it is in *Angst* that the world is given in such a way that it *no longer* matters at all. Entities in the world no longer speak to me (the pure 'that it is' is all that remains); the world is uncanny (*unheimlich*); my involvements with others 'recede' until I grasp myself as the *solus ipse* (BT 231–33/186–89). This does not mean that I find myself alone; rather, I discover my subjectivity, a dimension of my being that is extrinsic to every 'totality of involvements'. Only now does it become ontologically apparent (though still only

negatively) how I can be a 'towards which' that 'has *no* further involvement'. Second, if all mood has its self-understanding, then the understanding belonging to *Angst* must stand in stark contrast to all those 'for-the-sake-ofs' in which the world matters to me in some way. If things in the world lose all significance, this is because the practical self-understandings that support them have all collapsed. In anxiety I can no longer 'press forward into possibilities', can no longer cope in terms of some ability to be. But if that is so, how can I be aware of myself, since I am no longer 'reflected back to myself from things'? Such a state Heidegger calls 'death' – in which I exist as the 'possibility of the impossibility of being there' (BT 294/250). The 'impossibility of being there' does not refer to demise, to my absence from the realm of the living; rather, it indicates that my self-awareness, or self-understanding, is not dependent on any one of my abilities to be or on all of them taken together. There is a way that I am which is not an ability to be. Since 'understanding' my 'finitude' in this sense contrasts with all *possible* concrete 'for-the-sake-ofs', it is a form of inwardness, altogether invisible ('unintelligible') from the standpoint of the one-self. In Heidegger's terms, death is unrepresentable, my 'ownmost' possibility.

Finally, Heidegger identifies the third moment of the care-structure in breakdown – discourse – with conscience (*Gewissen*), emphasizing its break with the one-self by noting that conscience discourses exclusively in the mode of 'keeping silent'. However, where the analyses of *Angst* and death yield insights mainly into what the first-person is not, Heidegger's analysis of the two sides of conscience – 'what is talked about' and 'what is said' (BT 317/272) – elucidates the *positive* role of first-person self-awareness. By 'what is talked about' Heidegger means that 'to which the appeal is made'; by 'what is said' he means what conscience 'gives to understand' about that to which the appeal is made. Analyzing the first, Heidegger provides an existential ontological account of the peculiarities of first-person self-reference; analyzing the second, he shows the philosophical significance of subjectivity. I shall examine each in turn.

V. First-Person Self-Awareness in the Call of Conscience: Radical Indexicality

That to which the call of conscience is addressed is 'Dasein itself'. Now, since Dasein is not an entity with properties, the 'itself' (Dasein's *Jemeinigkeit*) must be understood as involving modalized *possibilities* for being itself. To mark this modalization Heidegger distinguishes between the one-self and the 'Self'. The phenomenon of conscience belongs to the breakdown of the one-self: 'And because only the *Self* of the one-self gets appealed to and brought to hear, the "one" collapses' (BT 317/272). What Heidegger here misleadingly

calls the 'Self' is, I believe, more properly thought as the subjectivity, or first-person self-awareness, of Dasein.[25]

In the language Heidegger uses to describe this Self or subject, it is easy to recognize the peculiarities of first-person self-reference we identified above. First, according to Heidegger, my awareness of myself as the one addressed in the call dispenses with all third-person identifying descriptions: 'Not to what Dasein counts for, can do, or concerns itself with in being with one another publicly, nor to what it has taken hold of, set about, or let itself be carried along with', but only the 'Self of the one-self gets appealed to' (BT 317/272). Thus, in grasping my Self (as 'subject'), I do so in an immediate, non-criterial, and non-inferential way. I am not, in other words, aware of myself *as* anything; nevertheless, I can 'identify' myself. Dasein therefore 'knows' itself to be irreducible to any definite description, no matter how detailed – including the comprehensive narrative of its own life. The first-person cannot be absorbed into its own history.[26]

Second, the lack of such identifying descriptions does not make the identification less, but rather more, certain. Conscience, as a kind of first-person self-reference, infallibly picks out its referent. As Heidegger writes, even though 'the call passes over *what* Dasein, proximally and for the most part, understands itself *as*', nevertheless 'the Self has been reached, *unequivocally and unmistakably*' (BT 319/274). The call is 'unequivocal' – it always picks out just the thing it aims at – because it is non-criterial: first-person self-reference is a pure indexical, not based on any potentially misfiring definite description or ostention. And it is 'unmistakable' – cannot fail to refer – because the call is immediate and non-inferential. In hearing the call I am addressed in such a way that the question of whether there *is* anyone to whom the call is addressed makes no sense.

This 'unmistakability' is the key to the analysis of conscience and shows the existential origin of Wittgenstein's idea that the subject is the limit of the world. Heidegger notes that 'when the caller reaches him to whom the appeal is made, it does so with a cold assurance which is uncanny but by no means obvious' (BT 322/277). *Why* is it futile to argue with this 'cold assurance' of conscience, to appeal to mitigating circumstances, to try to hide? If we had only Division I to go on the answer would by no means be 'obvious', since from the public point of view I am exclusively what I do, and those public descriptions can always be misapplied, even by myself. I can always 'fail to recognize' myself in them or be in error about whether they apply to me. In Division II, however, the reason for this 'cold assurance' with which I am identified in the call becomes clear: 'when Dasein has been individualized down to itself in its uncanniness, it is for itself something that simply cannot be mistaken for anything else' (BT 322/277). *For itself* – that is, from the first-person point of view – Dasein is 'radically' deprived 'of the possibility of

misunderstanding itself' because it is not 'reflected back from things' but rather directly confronts the mineness of *Existenz* as such.

Thus when Heidegger writes that 'the call is precisely something which *we ourselves* have neither planned nor prepared for nor voluntarily performed, nor have we ever done so', 'we ourselves' is used in the sense of the one-self. The call is neither an intentional act of expectation, desire, or belief, nor a 'performance' by the 'agent' in the world; rather, 'It' calls, 'against our expectations and even against our will' (BT 320/275). Yet it 'does not come from someone else who is with me in the world' either. The 'It' who calls is 'from me and yet from beyond me and over me' (BT 320/275). Heidegger resolves this paradox by appealing to the modalized structure of *Existenz*: it is 'Dasein, which finds itself [*sich befindet*] in the very depths of its uncanniness', who is 'the caller of the call of conscience' (BT 321/276). By worldly criteria, such a caller is 'nothing at all' (BT 321/276), and yet 'the call comes from that entity which in each case I myself am' (BT 323/278). In conscience we learn what it *means* to say 'I myself'.

Here we locate the place of the first-person in *Being and Time*. It is neither the one-self (who says 'I' but not as 'I myself'), nor the authentic Self (a 'modification' of the one-self), but the hidden condition of both. The uncanny 'nothing at all' revealed in breakdown and voiced as conscience is Dasein's '*basic kind of being in the world*, even though in an everyday way it has been covered up' (BT 322/277). Thus even though the call 'to the Self in the one-self does not force it inwards upon itself, so that it can close itself off from the "exterior world" ' (BT 318/273), this is not because subjectivity is always somehow 'part' of that world or totality of significance. Rather, it is because this image of subjectivity – an 'interior' space of representations cut off from the 'external' world – is *not subjective enough*. Such an interior psychological space *is* merely a peculiar part of the world in Heidegger's sense, whereas subjectivity, conscience as Kierkegaardian inwardness, is the hidden condition of the world as a space of meaning. Admittedly, we have not yet discovered what it is about conscience that makes it such a condition, but the second aspect of Heidegger's analysis – his account of 'what is said' in the call – provides just that, and with it the philosophical significance of first-person authority in *Being and Time* becomes apparent.

VI. Conscience: the Origin of Reason

Heidegger's great achievement in *Being and Time* is to have demonstrated that care is prior to reason – that *homo cura* is more fundamental than the *animale rationale*. But the account of intentionality offered in Division I contains, as we saw, a gap: the analysis of practical, goal-oriented action supplies a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the intelligibility

(world) upon which intentionality depends. A further condition on intentionality is provided by Division II's account of subjectivity as inwardness, conscience as first-person self-awareness. But why is conscience a necessary condition of intelligibility? The thesis I would like to explore is that it is because intelligibility involves something like the *capacity* for 'reason' in the sense of an ability to act in light of norms, and that conscience is the origin of this capacity.[27]

Support for this identification can be gleaned from the word – *Gewissen* – itself, for it invites the sort of analysis Heidegger offered when he introduced the notion of *Gestell* in 'The Question Concerning Technology'. There Heidegger explained that the 'Ge' prefix signifies a kind of 'gathering' that 'primordially unfolds' – not a mere collection but that which delimits the 'essence' or being of what is gathered, that which makes it what it is, 'enables' it.[28] Accordingly, *Ge-wissen* would signify a gathering of 'knowing'; conscience would be what enables the various (practical and theoretical) modes of knowing in the broadest sense, that from which *episteme*, *phronesis*, etc., 'primordially unfold'. It is instructive to note that this is just the role Heidegger attributes to *nous* (reason) in his *Sophist* lectures.[29] A second consideration ties the notion of conscience to that of reason. As a call, conscience is something that is heard (*gehört*). Though the call is 'silent', Heidegger insists that it thereby 'loses nothing of its perceptibility' (BT 318/273). The word he uses here is *Vernehmlichkeit*. To perceive in this way – *vernehmen* – is indeed to hear, but it is a hearing whose acoustic dimension is subordinated to a responsiveness to meaning, just as the *Sicht* (sight) of *Umsicht* is similarly subordinated.[30] Now this very term – *vernehmen* – is the root of the German word for reason (*Vernunft*). This might suggest that conscience (*Gewissen*) is the gathering-enabling of knowing and deliberating precisely as the hearing-perceiving (*vernehmen*) of a call, or meaningful claim, the response to which (*ver-antworten*) is a unique 'possibility' for being: *Vernunft*.

Primary support for the thesis, however, is found in Heidegger's description of 'what is said' in the call, namely, the accusation 'Guilty!' As he did with the concept of death, Heidegger formalizes the everyday notion of guilt in such a way that 'those ordinary phenomena of "guilt" which are related to our concernful being with others will *drop out*' – phenomena related to everyday 'reckoning' as well as to 'any law or "ought" ' (BT 328/283). Artificial though it seems, this formalization simply reflects the character of the call as that mode of discourse which articulates the *un*intelligibility of Dasein when, as *Angst*/death, its ordinary ties to the world break down. From this point of view, 'being-guilty' is not a 'predicate for the "I am" ' (BT 326/281), contingent upon some worldly relation; it is the fundamental *condition* of subjectivity, the first-person, as such. The call 'articulates' an understanding of one's own being prior to any sense of

'owing' or indebtedness – any sense of having, through one's actions in the world, incurred debts or obligations – because, as Heidegger states, such a mode of being is the *condition of possibility* for indebtedness and obligation (BT 329/284). 'What is said in the call' articulates the self-understanding (self-awareness) of that being who is the ground of obligation. But in what sense?

When am I indebted to someone? When do I owe someone something? It cannot be simply when I take something that someone has in her possession, or when I receive something from someone. Rather, there must be a norm of appropriate exchange in place. Now this norm cannot simply be something that is imposed on me from the outside – a behavior that is enforced, say, by social (herd) conditioning in such a way that typical and normal behavior of the herd results. This could never establish that 'I' *owe* someone something, but only that there has been a failure to conform to what is typical or expected. *Being*-indebted is not simply a state but something that I, from a first-person point of view, must be 'able to be'; and this means that I must be able to *recognize* the norm as normative, that is, as a claim *addressed* to me and not merely a pattern descriptive of 'our' normal behavior. The fact that I can be characterized from a third-person point of view as 'owing' something is ontologically parasitical on being capable of first-person self-awareness in Heidegger's sense.[31] If one says that this ability is made possible by 'internalization' of the social sanctions that normalize the behavior of the herd, this can be accepted only if one also accepts that this internalization changes everything.[32] For it signifies a being who no longer merely conforms to norms, but who can act 'in light of' them. To act in light of norms is to recognize them as claims to validity and so, potentially, to *measure* them against an altogether different sort of standard – a 'meta-norm' that Heidegger, following Plato, occasionally names 'the good'.[33] This is the sort of first-person authority that derives from first-person self-awareness as conscience. In Heidegger's terms, first-person authority is responsibility (*Verantwortlichkeit*). Responsibility transforms a creature who is 'grounded' by social norms into a ground of obligation – one who 'grounds' norms by *giving* grounds, that is, reasons.[34]

The claim that first-person authority consists in the possibility of grounding as reason-giving is, I believe, entailed by Heidegger's (alas, obscure) description of 'being-guilty'. Heidegger begins with Dasein's thrownness – the fact that Dasein 'has been brought into its "there", but *not* of its own accord' (BT 329/284) – and identifies this as the 'ground' (*Grund*) of Dasein's 'potentiality-for-being' (BT 330/284). What sort of ground is that? Against the traditional notion of a self-grounding transcendental subject, Heidegger emphasizes Dasein's lack of 'power' over this ground: Dasein is 'never existent *before* its ground, but only *from* it'; and this means '*never* to have power over one's being from the ground up' (BT 330/284). Many readings of

thrownness – and so of the nature of this ground – have been offered. For instance, it has been read as Nature, as the particular social practices into which I am born, as historical situatedness, and so on. Without taking a stand on the correctness of any particular reading,[35] they all take such a ground of Dasein to be something that determines, conditions, or explains significant aspects of behavior (for instance, the *range* of possible choices). Because they lie by definition beyond Dasein's power, such grounds belong essentially to third-person accounts; that is, they provide reasons for Dasein's behavior that are not (and cannot be) *Dasein's reasons*. In McDowell's Sellarsian terms, the grounds espied in Dasein's thrownness locate Dasein within the 'realm of law' (whether natural or bio-social), not the 'space of reasons'.[36] That is, whatever it is that provides the ground of Dasein's 'possibility for being' and brings Dasein 'into its "there"'' may indeed normalize behavior, but it is insufficient to generate the sort of obligation analyzed above; it does not provide reasons – grounds – in the sense of justifications.

However, while Dasein, as thrown, is grounded in this sense, this does not exhaust the meaning of 'being-guilty'. Heidegger argues that Dasein *is* this thrown ground only 'in that it projects itself upon possibilities into which it has been thrown' (BT 330/284); that is the 'Self' or subject as such 'has to lay the ground for itself', as 'existing' it 'must *take over* being a ground' (BT 330/284).[37] But what can it mean to say that Dasein must 'take over being a ground'? Here too there are some usual readings, none of which can be quite right. To say that to take over being a ground is to acknowledge my facticity – to adopt a kind of anti-transcendental philosophical humility in the face of a higher power, as it were – does not do justice to the idea of *being* a ground. More promising is the idea that I 'take responsibility' for my facticity, 'own' it, make it my own through the '*choice* of one possibility' (BT 331/285). But while it is true that Dasein can choose itself transparently, in full knowledge that it thereby 'waives' the choice of other possibilities, this cannot be the whole story. We might say that in this way Dasein *commits* itself to something specific in which it finds itself thrown. But it seems that to 'take over being a ground' cannot simply be a matter of entering 'seriously' into a game, so to speak, whose rules and norms are already established 'as' rules and norms. If I am right about the kind of grounds that Dasein's thrownness provides, these do not yet suffice to constitute genuine 'games', since games involve a sort of free-play in which I play not only according to the rules but in light of them. To stop with the concept of commitment (resoluteness) is to allow the first-person no role in the *constitution* of the 'space of reasons', when in fact – as I believe Heidegger's text suggests – it is essential to it.

On this reading, to 'take over being a ground' would be to translate, as it were, grounds as given determinants into grounds as (justifying) *reasons* (*Gründe*). This translation occurs when, in breakdown, I grasp the givens as mere *claims*, that is, as 'possibilities' opened up by Dasein's 'understanding

of being' itself. To recognize the character of grounds as possibilities is what Heidegger calls 'freedom' (BT 331/285).[38] Freedom is not essentially the ability to choose between possibilities, but the difference between the third-person and the first-person as such. Animals, one might say, can choose whether to run and hide or stay and fight, but freedom consists in the gap that opens up between *any* such goal-directed action in the world and the *breakdown* of all that – in *Angst*/death – which reveals my having to 'take over being a ground'. Yet we must be clear here: it is not the capacity for breakdown itself that is decisive, since animals, too, can break down. When animals break down, however, they lose themselves entirely, have 'nothing left'. Dasein can break down in this way, as in the extremity of psychosis. But in the face of *Angst*/death Dasein can also discover a hidden resource, its being-guilty, the ability to *take over* being a ground. What conditions one is thus exposed as a mere claim, for whose grounding – in the sense of measuring that claim in light of a meta-norm – I am called to be responsible. In this way conscience is the origin of reason.

Conscience is first-person authority as Kierkegaardian inwardness – invisible (and hence paradoxical) to third-person accounts of identity. And thus one might think of Abraham when Heidegger speaks, in his 1929 inaugural lecture, 'What is Metaphysics?', of the 'anxiety of those who are daring' as 'in secret alliance with the cheerfulness and gentleness of creative longing'.[39] What looks like a collapse of everything that matters instead reveals the condition for the possibility that anything can matter at all. In this sense, 'subjectivity is the truth' – not because it is the site of an irrefragable evidence, an interior space of certain representations, but because, apart from all practical identity, all *Umwillen*, I am a being through whom obligation – that is, first of all, responsibility for reason – enters the world. This is the *positive* meaning of the claim that Dasein is the 'sole authentic for the sake of which', something 'in which there is *no* further involvement', an end in itself.[40]

VII. Conclusion: First-Person Authority and the Good

Let me conclude by bringing out one more bit of evidence that suggests that conscience, as 'taking over being a ground', is the origin of reason. This comes from the essay 'Vom Wesen des Grundes', which Heidegger contributed to Husserl's *Festschrift* in 1929. There the question that *Being and Time* leaves unspoken is made explicit: 'To what extent does there lie in transcendence the intrinsic possibility of something like *Grund* [ground, reason] in general?'.[41] Dasein's 'transcendence' here means the casting of 'something like the "for the sake of" projectively before it'. 'Although it exists in the midst of beings and embraced by them', writes Heidegger,

'Dasein as existing has always already surpassed nature'(EG 109), and it is by means of such transcendence, or surpassing, that 'Dasein for the first time comes toward that being that *it* is, and comes toward it *as* it "itself" ' (EG 108). As we have seen, Dasein can come 'toward that being that it is' in two ways: the way of everyday Dasein 'reflected back from things', and the way it comes 'toward it *as* it "itself" ' in the collapse of the one-self. Though both of these are modes of self-relation or self-awareness, we have seen that only the latter suffices to explain why Dasein is something like an 'end in itself' that can anchor the teleological 'totality of involvements' into the intelligibility of a world. In 'Vom Wesen des Grundes' Heidegger explains this fact by interpreting Dasein's surpassing of beings in terms of Plato's *agathon epekeina tes ousias* – the good beyond beings. 'Yet may we interpret the *agathon* as the transcendence of Dasein?' he asks; and answers: 'the essence of the *agathon* lies in its sovereignty over itself [*Mächtigkeit seiner selbst*] as *hou heneka* – as the "for the sake of" it is the source of possibility as such' (EG 124). Only as *sovereignty* is self-awareness the anchor of intelligibility, and only the first-person of Division II is sovereign in the sense of 'taking over being a ground'. To say that the essence of the good lies in sovereignty is to say that the meta-norm of 'the good' itself emerges, as such, only with conscience. Sovereignty over myself is not a matter of self-creation or 'self-fashioning'; nor is it the essence of the good in the sense that whatever I choose is *eo ipso* right. Rather, thanks to sovereignty – the ability to take over being a ground – I am able to judge and act 'in light of' the good, in light of 'what is best'; that is, in terms of (justificatory) *reasons.* This does not mean that I must 'know the good'; it signifies only the emergence of what can be called a *critical practice* in the existing of an entity that is sovereign over itself, an entity for whom the question of what *ought* to be makes sense.

The essence of this critical practice is responsibility (*Verantwortlichkeit*). Heideggerian 'freedom' means that 'there occurs the Dasein in human beings, such that in the essence of their existence they can be obligated to themselves', thereby in turn 'making possible something binding, indeed obligation in general' (EG 126). Heidegger goes on to say that reason, as 'account giving', arises from such self-obligation, but he does not say how (EG 130–1). If we recall that Dasein responds to the call of conscience by 'taking over being a ground', however, we can see that such responsiveness does not simply consist in committing myself to some course of action, but in making myself *accountable* for it – that is, in accounting for myself, giving reasons.

The possibility of everyday discourse ('communication') rests originally on this proto-act of offering reasons. To respond to the call – and a 'free-floating call from which "nothing ensues" is an impossible fiction when seen existentially' (BT 324/279) – to 'become accountable', is to speak to the other, to communicate. When I give reasons and communicate as the one-self,

this is a *trace* of my subjectivity, possible only for a creature that can be responsible, can answer the call of conscience. For Heidegger, as for Kant, then, giving reasons is the 'evidence' of first-person authority. Only 'I' can do it; the very notion only makes sense for a creature that is not simply a 'reflection back from things', a practical identity absorbed in the world.[42] By opening up a space in which I can recognize something like a 'claim', my response to the call transforms the 'throwness' which I share with all conforming herd-animals into a *world* of meaning. In this way, intentionality, 'ontic transcendence?', finds its ultimate condition in first-person authority.[43]

NOTES

1 Martin Heidegger, *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, trans. Theodore Kisiel (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985), p. 110; *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, Gesamtausgabe 20, ed. Petra Jaeger (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1979), p. 152.
2 John Haugeland, 'The Intentionality All-Stars', in *Having Thought* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 127–70, here pp. 132, 147. Haugeland concludes his article by acknowledging that all the positions he has examined 'are alike in confronting intentionality only from the outside – in the "third person," as it were' and notes that an approach from the first-person would require 'entirely different strategies and considerations' (p. 162). The present essay suggests one such consideration.
3 An example of the first would be Jerry Fodor, *The Language of Thought* (New York: Crowell, 1975); an example of the second, Hilary Putnam, 'The Meaning of "Meaning" ', in *Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers*, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), pp. 215–71.
4 This is the position Haugeland, 'Intentionality All-Stars', op. cit., p. 147, describes as 'neo-pragmatism', under which he includes Robert Brandom, Wilfrid Sellars, Hubert Dreyfus, and himself. He also includes Heidegger, though in a note appended at a later date he admits that 'there is a "pragmatist" strain *at most* in [Division I of *Being and Time*]. Certainly the larger tendency of the work is profoundly non-pragmatist'. See also Mark Okrent, *Heidegger's Pragmatism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988).
5 E.g., in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre makes this point in *criticism* of Heidegger, while Mark Okrent, in *Heidegger's Pragmatism*, op. cit., makes the same point in *praise* of Heidegger.
6 Heidegger uses this phrase occasionally to identify the topic of his *Daseinsanalytik*, most frequently when he is comparing it to Kant's project. See, e.g., Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 45; *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1976), p. 24. Henceforth, references to *Being and Time* will be cited in the text with English, followed by German, pagination. At times I have altered the translation without comment.
7 John Haugeland has introduced a first-person notion of 'commitment' as a necessary condition on intentionality. I take my account to be compatible with his, though if 'commitment' is understood as rendering Heidegger's *Entschlossenheit*, my concern in the present essay is with a condition of commitment itself: the care structure as it is revealed in the collapse of practical engagement in the world. See John Haugeland, 'Truth and Rule-Following', op. cit., pp. 305–61, esp. pp. 339–43; and 'Truth and Finitude: Heidegger's Transcendental Existentialism', *Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity: Essays in Honor of Hubert Dreyfus*, vol. 1, ed. Mark Wrathall and Jeff Malpas (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 43–78.
8 *Martin Heidegger/Karl Jaspers Briefwechsel 1920–1963*, ed. Walter Biemel and Hans Saner (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1990), p. 71. Letter of December 16, 1926.
9 David Carr, *The Paradox of Subjectivity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 77.

10 Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*: *A Commentary on Heidegger's* Being and Time-*Division I* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 13, 74–75, 147. Frederick A. Olafson, *Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 27, in contrast, argues that Heidegger does seek a 'reconstructed concept of the subject', that is, of 'the subject-entity as that for which other entities exist as such' (p. 32). For a critical discussion see Frederick A. Olafson, 'Heidegger *à la* Wittgenstein, or "Coping" with Professor Dreyfus', *Inquiry* 37 (1994), pp. 45–64; Taylor Carman, 'On Being Social: A Reply to Olafson', *Inquiry* 37 (1994), pp. 203–24; and Frederick A. Olafson, 'Individualism, Subjectivity, and Presence: A Reply to Taylor Carman', *Inquiry* 37 (1994), pp. 331–8.

11 Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, op. cit.,p. 57.

12 Martin Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 159; *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, Gesamtausgabe 24, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975), p. 227.

13 See Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Subjekt und Dasein* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1974), p. 65.

14 See, e.g., Charles Siewert, *The Significance of Consciousness* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998); and David Chalmers, *The Conscious Mind* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

15 About Husserl's own investigation into consciousness Heidegger notes that 'a "formal phenomenology of consciousness" ' is a legitimate 'phenomenological problematic in its own right' (BT 151/115), but he doesn't tell us what its relation to his own existential analytic would be. Similarly, in *History of the Concept of Time*, op. cit., p. 108 (*Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, p. 149), Heidegger admits that 'this consideration [of consciousness as object of a science] is in fact possible'.

16 My discussion in this section is greatly indebted to conversations with Mark Okrent, whose forthcoming book on intentionality makes illuminating use of the concept of 'type'. See also Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, op. cit., ch. 4, and Haugeland, 'The Intentionality All-Stars', op. cit., pp. 147–53, on conformism and normativity.

17 I borrow this strategy from Dan Zahavi, who employs it in his exemplary book, *Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1999), ch. 1. I have also found Tomis Kapitan, 'First-Person Reference', and James Hart, 'Castañeda: A Continental Philosophical Guise', to be helpful here. Both are found in Hector-Neri Castañeda, *The Phenomeno-logic of the I: Essays on Self-Consciousness*, ed. James Hart and Tomis Kapitan (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).

18 Of course, I can be wrong about what I feel, but not about the fact that it is *I* who feel it. Zahavi, *Self-Awareness and Alterity*, op. cit., p. 5.

19 Cited in ibid., p. 7.

20 Ibid., p. 8.

21 Ibid., pp. 9–10. Ernst Tugendhat, *Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination*, trans. Paul Stern (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986) misses just this point when he argues that 'I' can be defined simply as the term 'each of us uses to refer to himself'. This leads him to the claim that 'I cannot identify myself by the use of the word *I*' since 'the word *I* designates the ultimate reference point of all identification, though the person referred to by it – the speaker – is not identified; but he is referred to as identifiable from the "he" perspective' (p. 73). In other words, all identification is criterial, by way of public, third-person descriptions. What is missing is a grasp of the kind of self-awareness entailed in the very *meaning* of 'I'. This kind of self-'identification' is not an answer to the question 'Who am I?' – as Tugendhat supposes (p. 209) – but rather an encounter with what generates the asymmetry between my *being* the 'ultimate reference point of all identification', on the one hand, and the 'person . . . identifiable from the "he" perspective' on the other. This first-person self-awareness does not depend on my identifying myself in terms of any third-person descriptions of 'who' I am.

22 The relation between the transcendental and the empirical ego in Husserl is notoriously disputed, but for some recent discussions see Dan Zahavi, *Self-Awareness and Alterity*, op.

cit., pp. 138–56, and Robert Sokolowski, *Introduction to Phenomenology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 112–29. For discussions that include Heidegger's stance toward the problem, see David Carr, *The Paradox of Subjectivity*, op. cit., and Steven Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths Toward Transcendental Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), chs 9 and 13.

23 Like Wittgenstein, Tugendhat, *Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination*, op. cit., pp. 56–76, denies that the 'logic' of 'I' has any ontological relevance, while Taylor Carman, 'On Being Social: A Reply to Olafson', op. cit., p. 216, uses Wittgenstein's dictum that 'nothing in the visual field warrants the conclusion that it is seen from an eye' to gloss Heidegger's supposed non-subjective account of the 'mineness' of everyday coping.

24 Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, op. cit., p. 161.

25 In spite of Heidegger's aversion to the language of 'subjectivity', there is even some textual warrant for my terminological preference. For Heidegger notes that the existential analysis of conscience 'does justice to the "objectivity" of the appeal for the first time by *leaving it its "subjectivity"*, which of course denies the one-self its dominion' (BT 323/278). Conscience defines the domain of 'subjectivity', but this is not an inner space of mental representations. As Heidegger explicitly states, 'neither the call, nor the deed which has happened, nor the guilt with which one is laden, is an occurrence with the character of something present at hand which runs its course' in the stream of *Erlebnisse* (BT 337/291).

26 This point is elaborated in Steven Crowell, 'Authentic Historicality' (forthcoming).

27 This does not mean that Heidegger provides a complete account of reason, but he does indicate the ontological place for such an account. Thus it is not true, as Tugendhat, *Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination*, op. cit., p. 215, states that Heidegger's account of resoluteness is 'an attempt to banish reason from human existence and in particular from the relation of oneself to oneself'. Tugendhat recognizes that 'Heidegger's concept of self-determination not only admits of extension through a relation to reason but also demands this extension on its own grounds' (p. 215), but because he never considers the analysis of conscience, he conceives this 'extension' as coming from outside the Heideggerian project. On the other hand, to specify such a 'relation to reason' immanently, by employing the concept of *phronesis* – as does Einar Øverenget, *Seeing The Self: Heidegger on Subjectivity* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1998), pp. 223–31 – is to ignore the fact that this sort of 'practical' reason cannot account for its own 'rationality'. Tugendhat, in contrast, clearly recognizes that the 'autonomy' analyzed in Division II is what makes possible the step from normativity to validity, from conformity to criticism, from understanding to reason.

28 Martin Heidegger, 'The Question Concerning Technology', in *The Question Concerning Technology and other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 19.

29 Martin Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, Gesamtausgabe 19, ed. Ingeborg Schüßler (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1992), pp. 143, 156–64.

30 In *Being and Time* Heidegger 'formalizes' the notion of 'sight' to signify 'access in general' (BT 187/147) and argues that everyday coping is not 'blind'; it 'has its own sight'. That this is not merely a matter of the physiology of the optical organ is clear: 'Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of the *"in order to"*. And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves is *circumspection* [*Umsicht*]' (BT 98/69).

31 What Heidegger is getting at here reflects Korsgaard's distinction between 'criteria of explanatory and normative adequacy': 'The difference is one of perspective. A theory that could explain why someone does the right thing – in a way that is adequate from a third-person perspective – could nevertheless fail to justify the action from the agent's own, first-person perspective, and so fail to support its normative claims.' Christine Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 14.

32 Nietzsche, one source for this idea, emphasizes that conscience, as internalization of punishment, gives rise to an 'uncanny illness'. But it also creates the world's first *interesting* animal: '[T]he existence on earth of an animal soul turned against itself, taking sides against itself, was something so new, profound, unheard of, enigmatic, contradictory, and *pregnant with a future* that the aspect of the earth was essentially altered.' Friedrich

Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morals*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage, 1969), p. 85 (Second Essay, Section 16).

33 See, e.g., Martin Heidegger, *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 184; *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik*, Gesamtausgabe 26, ed. Klaus Held (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), p. 237; and also the essay 'Vom Wesen des Grundes', to be discussed below.

34 The fact (which Heidegger emphasizes in his critique of rationalism) that giving reasons at some point 'gives out' is no argument against the claim that the practice of giving reasons – a practice that originates not with normativity as such but with normativity in relation to a creature capable of the first-person perspective – is constitutive of 'worldhood' as the space of intelligibility.

35 I take a stand on them in Steven Crowell, 'Facticity and Transcendental Philosophy', forthcoming in a volume edited by Jeff Malpas.

36 John McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), p. 71, n. 2. In this comparison I am not committing myself to the details of McDowell's account, but only to something like this distinction. Compare Haugeland, 'Intentionality All-Stars', op. cit., p. 151: 'To say that biological and social categories are "emergent" is not to say, of course, that they are incompatible with vapid materialism or exempt from the laws of nature. Quite the contrary: it is only because conformism is itself in some sense a "causal" process that the emergent social pattern is nonaccidental in the sense required for intentionality.' On the problem of 'double grounding' implied in Heidegger's discussion, see Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning,* op. cit., ch. 12.

37 The entire passage would be relevant for my argument, but I can only cite it here without detailed commentary: 'Der Nichtcharakter dieses Nicht bestimmt sich existenzial: *Selbst* seiend ist das Dasein das geworfene Seiende *als* Selbst. *Nicht durch* es selbst, sondern *an* es selbst *entlassen* aus dem Grunde, um *als dieser* zu sein. Das Dasein is nicht insofern selbst der Grund seines Seins, als dieser aus eigenem Entwurf erst entspringt, wohl aber ist es als Selbstsein das *Sein* des Grundes. Dieser ist immer nur Grund eines Seienden, dessen Sein das Grundsein zu übernehmen hat.'

38 Heidegger's position here is quite close to Kant's, well captured by Korsgaard: 'According to Kant it follows from the fact that a rational being acts "under the idea of freedom" . . . that she acts for a reason or on a principle which she must regard as voluntarily adopted. The point here has to do with the way a rational being must think of her actions when she is engaged in deliberation and choice. When you make a choice, you do not view yourself simply as impelled into it by desire or impulse. Instead, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is *you*, and that decides which if any of your desires to gratify' (Christine Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996], p. 57). See also Korsgaard, *Sources of Normativity*, op. cit., p. 94: 'If the bidding from outside is desire, then the point is that the reflective mind must endorse the desire before it can act on it, it must say to itself that the desire is a reason. As Kant put it, we must *make it our maxim* to act on the desire. Then although we may do what desire bids us, we do it freely.' For Dasein, nothing is a mere 'determinant' but is always subject to the measure of the possible.

39 Martin Heidegger, 'What is Metaphysics?', trans. David Farrell Krell, in *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 93.

40 Heidegger makes the connection explicit between Kant's notion of the *personalitas moralis* as an end-in-itself and his own concept of Dasein as ultimate 'for the sake of which' in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, op. cit., pp. 122–76; *Gründprobleme der Phänomenologie*, pp. 173–251.

41 Martin Heidegger, 'On the Essence of Ground', trans. William McNeill, in *Pathmarks*, ed. William McNeill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 125. Henceforth cited in the text as EG.

42 This implies that the first-person is the ground of dialogical (and thus also of dialectical) rationality, rather than the reverse. To argue this fully would take a separate paper, but see Steven Crowell, 'The Project of Ultimate Grounding and the Appeal to Intersubjectivity in Recent Transcendental Philosophy', *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 7(1999), pp. 31–54.

Steven Crowell, Department of Philosophy, Rice University, Houston, TX 77005, USA. E-mail: crowell@ruf.rice.edu